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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to decide this 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(i) (Supp. 1994). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in finding that 
Ms. Mezenen had not cohabitated with a member of the opposite sex 
and that, consequently, Mr. Mezenen was not entitled to a refund of 
alimony previously paid under temporary orders. The trial court's 
decision regarding cohabitation presents a mixed question of law 
and fact; the appellate court will defer to the trial court's 
findings unless they are shown to be clearly erroneous, but will 
review its ultimate decision for correctness. Pendleton v. 
Pendleton, 918 P.2d 159 (Utah Ct.App. 1996). 
2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by allowing Ms. 
Mezenen to amend her Complaint to add a claim for attorney's fees 
during the course of the trial. The standard of appellate review 
is an abuse of discretion. Kasco Servs. Corp. v. Benson, 831 P.2d 
86 (Utah 1992). 
3. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by awarding Ms. 
Mezenen her attorney fees and costs. The standard of appellate 
review is an abuse of discretion. Wells v. Wells, 871 P.2d 1036 
(Utah Ct.App. 1994). 
1 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
1. Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3 (1993). See Addendum A for a 
complete recitation of that section. 
2. Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 (Supp. Vol. 1995). See Addendum 
A for a complete recitation of that section. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Course of Proceedings. 
Linda Mezenen ("Ms. Mezenen") filed for divorce on September 
2, 1994, to dissolve her thirteen year marriage to Kelly Mezenen 
("Mr. Mezenen"). The case was tried before Judge Frank G. Noel in 
the Third Judicial District Court on January 30 and 31, 1996, and 
May 2 0 and 21, 1996. The court entered its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce on September 5, 1996. The 
Decree of Divorce provided for the following: 
1. Ms. Mezenen was not awarded any alimony or marital 
support. 
2. Mr. Mezenen was not entitled to a refund of alimony 
previously paid under the temporary orders, as his claim that Ms. 
Mezenen had engaged in cohabitation with a member of the opposite 
sex was denied. 
3. Mr. Mezenen was awarded a lot in Duchesne, Utah, as his 
sole and separate property, two vehicles, various personal items, 
a Certificate of Deposit in the amount of $13,000.00, all right, 
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title, and interest in Kelly's Excavating, LLC, the parties1 
marital residence on Bagpiper Circle, and one-half of personal 
loans due and owing to the parties. 
4. Ms. Mezenen was awarded her vehicle, various personal 
property, a New Haven building lot acquired by the parties, 
$12,700.00 as her share of the equity in the parties1 marital 
residence, less $5,800.00 representing Mr. Mezenenfs pre-marital 
funds used as a down payment, one-half of personal loans due and 
owing to the parties, and the amount of $64,900.00 payable from Mr. 
Mezenen to equalize the property award. 
5. Both parties were ordered to pay all separate debts 
incurred since September of 1994. 
6. Both parties were ordered to pay their own costs and 
attorney's fees; however, Mr. Mezenen was ordered to pay to Ms. 
Mezenen $10,000.00 in attorney's fees and $513.00 in costs. 
On October 2, 1996, Mr. Mezenen filed his Notice of Appeal. 
On October 8, 1996, Ms. Mezenen filed her Notice of Cross Appeal. 
B. Statement of Facts. 
1. The parties began residing together in the same home in 
July of 1986. (Exhibit A, I 3; Tr. Vol. I, p. 12; Tr. Vol. Ill, 
p. 542) . 
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2. The parties were married in November, 1989, and divorced 
on September 5, 1996, a marriage of approximately seven years. 
(Exhibit A, f 5; Tr. Vol. I, p. 22). 
3. At the time of trial, Mr. Mezenen and Ms. Mezenen were 
both 34 years of age. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 3; Tr. Vol. II, p. 536). 
4. There were no children born as the issue of the marriage. 
However, Ms. Mezenen has two children from previous relationships. 
Mr. Mezenen has one child from a prior marriage. (Exhibit A, f 2; 
Tr. Vol. II, pp. 543-544). 
5. The parties decided to form an excavation business, 
Kelly's Excavating, LLC, in February of 1992. The business began 
as a sole proprietorship, but became a limited liability company in 
1994. (Exhibit A, f 10; Tr. Vol. Ill, pp. 555, 559). 
6. Ms. Mezenen worked for Sports Trax Kawasaki from 1991 to 
February, 1995, on both a part-time and full-time basis. She also 
worked a few hours a week at the parties' business, Kelly's 
Excavating, LLC, doing clerical work. (Exhibit A, f 9; Tr. Vol. I, 
pp. 6-7) . 
7. The court found that Ms. Mezenen was engaged in a 
training program with Ames Construction which would allow her to 
provide for her own support without any alimony from Mr. Mezenen, 
which she did not seek in any event. Consequently, permanent 
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alimony was not awarded. (Exhibit A, ff 14, 15; Exhibit B, f 2; 
Tr. Vol. I, p. 101). 
8. The court effected an equitable distribution of assets, 
which Mr. Mezenen does not contest on this appeal. (Exhibit B, ff 
6-10; Exhibit A, ff 22, 24-31, 34). The court also ordered that 
the parties be awarded their separate pre-marital property and 
property acquired since the separation with their separate funds, 
and that they separately assume debts incurred since their 
separation. (Exhibit A, f 29; Exhibit B, ff 5, 6, and 13). 
9. Prior to trial, Mr. Mezenen was ordered to pay Ms. 
Mezenen temporary alimony in the amount of $1,200.00 per month. 
(Exhibit A, f 16; Tr. Vol. I, p. 69; Tr. Vol. Ill, p. 604). 
10. All such alimony payments were in fact made. (Exhibit A, 
f 16; Tr. Vol. Ill, p. 604). 
11. Prior to the parties' separation, M&. Mezenen became 
acquainted with Mr. Robert Grumwald, who was employed by Ames 
Construction, and worked primarily in Nevada, Idaho, and Utah. 
(Tr. Vol. I, p. 112-113). 
12. The court found that Mr. Grumwald and Ms. Mezenen were 
not cohabitating and, consequently, Mr. Mezenen was not entitled to 
a refund of alimony previously paid Ms. Mezenen under the temporary 
orders. (Exhibit A, ff 17-20); Exhibit B, ff 3-4(|) . The court made 
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this finding despite the fact that, subsequent to the parties' 
separation, but prior to their divorce: 
(a) Mr. Grumwald stayed in Ms. Mezenen's home for 
overnight periods. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 116); 
(b) Mr. Grumwald and Ms. Mezenen traveled together 
outside the State of Utah, and went on camping trips within the 
state. (Exhibit A, f 17; Tr. Vol. I, pp. 128, 117-120, 133-137); 
(c) Mr. Grumwald and Ms. Mezenen engaged in sexual 
intercourse, when Mr. Grumwald was residing in Ms. Mezenen's home 
and when they traveled together. (Exhibit A, f 19; Tr. Vol. I, pp. 
118-119, 125); 
(d) while residing with Ms. Mezenen, Mr. Grumwald 
purchased some groceries for the home, assisted in cooking, 
performed household chores, helped Ms. Mezenen's children with 
their homework, attended teacher's conferences with Ms. Mezenen, 
used the utilities, including the telephone, had free access to Ms. 
Mezenen's residence, and stored snowmobiles in Ms. Mezenen's 
garage. (Exhibit A, f 19; Tr. Vol. I, pp. 123-124, 126-127); and 
(f) Mr. Mezenen observed Mr. Robert Grumwald and his 
vehicles at Ms. Mezenen's residence, which is approximately one and 
one-half blocks from Mr. Mezenen's residence, on various overnight 
occasions in the summer of 1995. (Tr. Vol. Ill, p. 607). 
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13. Furthermore, Mr. Grumwald's twenty-two year old daughter 
lived with Ms. Mezenen in her residence in May and June, 1995, 
without paying any rent to Ms. Mezenen. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 130-131). 
14. The court granted Ms. Mezenen's Motion to Amend her 
Complaint to add a claim for attorney's fees, despite the fact that 
such motion was not made until mid-trial. (Exhibit A, J 21). 
15. The court found that Ms. Mezenenfs Motion to Amend her 
Complaint to add a claim for attorney's fees was proper based upon 
Mr. Mezenen's alleged "concealment of assets." ^Exhibit A, f 21). 
16. The court's finding that Mr. Mezenen had concealed assets 
was based upon the testimony of Ms. Donna Chatwin, who previously 
had been involved in a relationship with Mr. Mezenen. (Exhibit A, 
1 21). 
17. The court found that the fees incurred by Ms. Mezenen's 
counsel in connection with his efforts to determine the assets of 
the business allegedly concealed by Mr. Mezenen in the sum of 
$10,000.00 were "reasonable," despite the fact that the court made 
no specific findings regarding the reasonableness of the fees, 
plaintiff's need for payment of such fees, or defendant's ability 
to pay. (Exhibit A, f 21). 
18. The court also awarded Ms. Mezenen costs in the amount of 
$513.00, for the deposition of Mr. Mezenen and the filing fee. 
Such award was also based upon Mr. Mezenen's alleged concealment of 
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assets, despite the fact that Ms. Mezenen did not file her Motion 
to Amend her Complaint until well after Mr. Mezenen's deposition 
had been taken. (Exhibit A, f 16; Exhibit B, f 21). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The trial court clearly abused its discretion in three 
respects. First, the court's finding regarding cohabitation is 
blatantly erroneous, in light of the evidence presented, including 
Ms. Mezenen's own testimony. Ms. Mezenen herself testified that 
Mr. Grumwald spent the night in her home on a number of occasions, 
that the two traveled together and engaged in sexual intercourse, 
that he helped with household chores, shared meals, assisted with 
her children, and stored vehicles in her garage. This evidence is 
plainly sufficient to support a finding of cohabitation under Utah 
law. Consequently, the court was required, under U.C.A. § 30-3-5, 
to order a refund of alimony previously paid Ms. Mezenen during the 
period of cohabitation. 
Second, the court clearly abused its discretion in allowing 
Ms. Mezenen to amend her Complaint to add a claim for attorney's 
fees midway through the trial. Such amendment was not only 
untimely, it significantly prejudiced Mr. Mezenen's right to 
examine Ms. Mezenen's counsel regarding such fees. 
Finally, the court's award of attorney's fees and costs is 
improper, both as to entitlement and amount. The court made 
8 
absolutely no finding regarding Ms. Mezenen's need for such fees, 
Mr. Mezenen's ability to pay, or the reasonableness of the 
requested fees, all of which are required under Utah law. 
Furthermore, the court's award of costs incurred in connection with 
Mr. Mezenen's deposition is patently inequitable, as the deposition 
was completed well before Ms. Mezenen amended her complaint or 
raised any claim regarding concealment of assets. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY 
FINDING THAT MS, MEZENEN DID NOT ENGAGE IN 
COHABITATION, DESPITE OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE 
TO THE CONTRARY, 
The trial court's finding that Ms. Mezenen did not engage in 
cohabitation is startling, and patently erroneous, in light of the 
evidence presented at trial regarding the details of Ms. Mezenen"s 
relationship with Mr. Grumwald. Under applicable Utah law, the 
uncontroverted testimony which was presented is more than 
sufficient to support a finding of cohabitation; in fact, it is 
difficult to imagine a clearer-cut case of cohabitation. 
Consequently, Mr. Mezenen is entitled to a refund of alimony he 
previously paid under the trial court's temporary orders. 
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In Sigg v. Siaa. 905 P.2d 908 (Utah Ct. App. 1995), this Court 
set forth the standard for a finding of cohabitation under Utah 
Code Ann- § 30-3-5(6) (1995). The Court noted: 
[i]n Utah, a party's obligation to pay alimony to a 
former spouse is terminated upon a showing of 
"cohabitation," which means the former spouse is residing 
with a person of the opposite sex and engaging in sexual 
contact with that person . . . [c]ommon residency means 
"the sharing of a common abode that both parties consider 
their principal domicile for more than a temporary or 
brief period of time. Sexual contact means participation 
in a relatively permanent sexual relationship akin to 
that generally existing between husband and wife." 
Id. at 917 (citing Haddow v. Haddowr 707 P. 2d 669, 672 (Utah 
1985) ) . 
This Court further found that, where Ms. Sigg and the alleged 
cohabitant possessed separate condominiums in the same condominium 
complex, but "had a sexual relationship, shared living expenses, 
had open access to each other's condominiums, ate together and 
shared food expenses, kept clothing in the same condominium, [and] 
used the same furniture . . . ." a finding of cohabitation was 
warranted. The Court made this finding despite the fact that Ms. 
Sigg contested whether or not the couple regularly shared food and 
living expenses, or kept food at the same condominium, noting that 
"the weight of the evidence supports the finding of 
cohabitation . . . ." Id. at 918. See Wacker v. Wackerr 668 P.2d 
533 (Utah 1983) (evidence supported finding of cohabitation where 
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the plaintiff and cohabitant resided together and engaged in a 
sexual relationship, despite the plaintiff's assertions that the 
two were merely "sharing expenses"). 
In Pendleton v. Pendleton, 918 P.2d 159 (Utah Ct. App. 1996), 
this Court held that a finding of cohabitation was warranted on 
strikingly similar facts to those at hand. The alleged cohabitant 
stayed with Ms. Pendleton in her home "ninety percent of the time" 
while he was in town, despite the fact that his job required 
substantial travel out of state. Furthermore, he came and went at 
will, and ate almost all of his meals with Ms. Pendleton while he 
was in town. Id. at 161. Consequently, a finding of cohabitation 
was warranted. 
Here, Ms. Mezenen's own testimony is more than sufficient to 
support, and frankly mandates, a finding of cohabitation. Ms. 
Mezenen admitted that Mr. Grumwald stayed in her home for overnight 
periods during 1995 when he was in the state of Utah, that the two 
traveled together outside the State of Utah on numerous trips which 
he financed, went on camping trips within the state, and engaged in 
sexual intercourse. Furthermore, while residing with Ms. Mezenen, 
Mr. Grumwald performed various household tasks obviously indicative 
of his position as a resident, rather than a guest. He purchased 
groceries on occasion and assisted with cooking and household 
chores. Significantly, he also helped Ms. Mezenen's children with 
11 
their homework and attended teacher's conferences with Ms. Mezenen. 
He used the utilities, including the telephone at will, and had 
free access to Ms. Mezenen's residence, where he stored snowmobiles 
and other vehicles. Additionally, Mr. Grumwald's daughter lived at 
her residence without charge for two months during 1995. 
In light of the prevailing standards for a finding of 
cohabitation under Utah law, and the substantial uncontroverted 
testimony which was presented on this issue, it is difficult to 
understand how any finding other than a finding of cohabitation 
could be reached. Consequently, the trial courtfs finding is 
patently erroneous, and should be reversed. 
II. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY AWARDED MS. 
MEZENEN HER ATTORNEY'S FEES. 
A. The Trial Court Erred by Granting Ms. Mezenenvs Motion to 
Amend her Complaint to add a Claim for Attorney's Fees 
Mid-Trial, Despite Substantial Prejudice to Mr. Mezenen. 
In her Verified Complaint for Divorce, not only did Ms. 
Mezenen fail to request an award of attorney's fees, she 
affiritiatively sought an order requiring each party to bear their 
own fees and costs. Despite this failure to request fees, the 
trial court granted Ms. Mezenen1s Motion, filed mid-trial, to amend 
her Complaint in clear deviation from prevailing standards of Utah 
law. Allowing Ms. Mezenen to add a new and distinct claim at such 
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a late date operated to substantially prejudice Mr, Mezenen's 
rights, particularly since his counsel did not have an opportunity 
to conduct any discovery or examination regarding the necessity and 
reasonableness of such fees. 
Amendment of pleadings is governed by Utah Rule of Civil 
Procedure 15(a)1. In Bekins Bar V Ranch v. Huth. 664 P. 2d 455 
(Utah 1983), the Supreme Court of Utah noted: 
[a] primary consideration that a trial judge must take into 
account in determining whether leave [to amend] should be 
granted is whether the opposing side would be put to 
unavoidable prejudice by having an issue adjudicated for which 
he has not had time to prepare. 
Id. at 464. See Ringwood v. Foreign Auto Works, Inc. , 786 P.2d 
1350 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) cert denied 795 P. 2d 1138 (Utah 1990) 
(trial court must consider whether parties have adequate notice to 
meet new issues and whether any party receives an unfair advantage 
or disadvantage from a leave to amend). 
In determining the propriety of a motion to amend a complaint 
on the eve of, or during, trial, Utah courts have uniformly held 
that the potential for severe prejudice to the adverse party weighs 
1
 Rule 15(a) provides "fa] party may amend his pleading once 
as a matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is 
served or, if the pleading is one to which no responsive pleading 
is permitted and the action has not been placed upon the trial 
calendar, he may so amend it at any time within 20 days after it is 
served. Otherwise a party may amend his pleading only by leave of 
court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave to 
amend shall be freely given when justice so requires." 
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heavily against amendment. In Girard v. Applebyf 660 P.2d 245 
(Utah 1983) the Utah Supreme Court noted that Rule 15(a) "is to be 
applied with less liberality when the amendments are proposed 
during or after trial, rather than before trial." Id. at 248. In 
Girard, the court found that the plaintiff's motion to amend its 
complaint to introduce "new and different causes of action" on the 
day of trial was properly denied, particularly in light of the 
potential disadvantage faced by defendants. Id. at 248. See 
Hein's Turkey Hatcheriesr Inc. v. Nephi Processing Plant, Inc., 470 
P. 2d 257 (Utah 1970) (an amended answer presented at the 
commencement of trial was properly excluded); Staker v. Huntington 
Cleveland Irrigation Co.r 664 P. 2d 1188 (Utah 1983) (trial court 
was well within its discretion in denying defendant's motion to 
amend answer on the day of trial to add a new statute of 
limitations defense). 
Here, Ms. Mezenen failed to raise any claim for attorney's 
fees until mid-trial. Consequently, Mr. Mezenen had no opportunity 
to conduct any discovery regarding the reasonableness or necessity 
of such fees. In fact, Mr. Mezenen had absolutely no reason to 
believe that any inquiry into amount or reasonableness of fees was 
even relevant, given the fact that Ms. Mezenen affirmatively sought 
an order requiring each party to bear their own fees and costs in 
her Complaint. Any claim of attorney's fees requires some 
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investigation regarding the number of hours spent on the case, the 
work performed, the efficiency of the attorneys involved, and other 
factors2. The mid-trial amendment introducing this issue virtually 
ensured that Mr. Mezenen would be unable to conduct this discovery. 
He was forced to defend against a claim with no information. It is 
difficult to imagine a clearer showing of prejudice. 
B. The Court's Order Regarding Attorney's Fees Does Not 
Address the Considerations Required by Utah Law 
2
 In fact, such a claim requires investigation and 
consideration of factors such as the following: "(1) [w]hat legal 
work was actually performed?; (2) how much of the work performed 
was reasonably necessary to adequately prosecute the matter?; (3) 
is the attorneys1 billing rate consistent with the rates 
customarily charged in the locality for similar services?; (4) are 
there circumstances which require consideration of additional 
factors, including those listed in the code of professional 
responsibility." Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P. 2d 985, 990 
(Utah 1988). Furthermore, Rule 1.5 of the Utah Rules of 
Professional Conduct requires consideration of: 
a. The time and labor required, the novelty and 
difficulty of the questions involved and the skill 
requisite to perform the legal service properly; 
b. The likelihood, if apparent to the client of the 
acceptance of the particular employment will 
preclude other employment by the lawyer; 
c. The fee customarily charged in the locality for 
similar legal services; 
d. The amount involved and the results obtained; 
e. The time limitations imposed by the client or by 
the circumstances; 
f. The nature and length of the professional rela-
tionship with the client; 
g. The experience, reputation and ability of the 
lawyer or lawyers performing the service; and 
h. Whether the fee is fixed or contingent. 
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Based upon Ms. Mezenen's mid-trial amendment of her Complaint, 
the trial court ordered Mr. Mezenen to pay $10,000.00 in attorney's 
fees and $513.00 in costs incurred by Ms. Mezenen, despite the fact 
that it made no finding whatsoever regarding Ms. Mezenen's need, 
Mr. Mezenen's ability to pay, or the reasonableness of the fees. 
This order does not conform to the requirements of Utah law, which 
compels consideration of such factors. 
Utah Code Ann. § 3 0-3-3 allows a court in a divorce action to 
order one party to pay the attorney's fees of the other party. In 
Bell v. Bell, 810 P.2d 489 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), this Court listed 
the factors to be considered in determining the propriety of an 
attorney's fee award. "The award must be based on evidence of the 
financial need of the receiving spouse, the ability of the other 
spouse to pay, and the reasonableness of the requested fees." Id. 
at 493. 
In determining the reasonableness of the requested fees, a 
court may consider "the difficulty of the litigation, the 
efficiency of the attorneys, the reasonableness of the number of 
hours spent on the case, the fee customarily charged in the 
locality, the amount involved in the case and the result attained, 
and the expertise and experience of the attorneys involved." Id. 
at 493-94. 
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Here, the court entered a fee award in Ms. Mezenen's favor 
based upon Mr. Mezenen's alleged concealment of assets. There are 
two fundamental flaws with that proposition. First, the court 
found that the fees incurred by Ms. Mezenen's counsel in connection 
with his efforts to determine "all of the assets of the business" 
in the sum of $10,000.00 were "reasonable." This conclusory 
assertion is insufficient to support an award of fees under Utah 
law, which requires consideration of the reasonableness of the 
fees, plaintiff's need for payment of such fees, and defendant's 
ability to pay. The court made no findings whatsoever regarding 
those factors. In fact, it is impossible to discern from the 
court's Findings whether or not need and ability ever entered into 
the court's consideration; rather, it appears that the award was 
entered solely on the basis of Mr. Mezenen's alleged concealment of 
assets. 
Utah appellate courts have not hesitated to reverse trial 
court decisions which do not properly employ consideration of these 
factors. In Rappleye v. Rappleye
 r 855 P. 2d 260 (Utah Ct. App. 
1993), this Court reversed an award of attorney's fees where the 
trial court's findings failed to demonstrate that the award was 
arrived at after consideration of the relevant factors. See First 
Sec. Servs. v. Perkins, 918 P.2d 480 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (holding 
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that all factors must be given careful consideration in 
determination of any attorney's fee award). 
The second problem with the court's award is the fact that it 
is based entirely upon Mr. Mezenen's alleged concealment of assets. 
The court based the award entirely on such alleged concealment, and 
awarded Ms. Mezenen costs in the amount of $513.00, for the 
deposition of Mr. Mezenen and the transcript. However, Ms. 
Mezenen's Motion to Amend her Complaint was filed mid-trial, well 
after Mr. Mezenen's deposition of September 29, 1995, had been 
taken. The finding of concealment was based upon the trial 
testimony of Donna Chatwin, who previously did some work for Mr. 
Mezenen at his business. The trial court's award of costs and 
fees, then, is even more insupportable; the deposition of Mr. 
Mezenen was taken well before Ms. Chatwin presented her testimony, 
which supported the trial court's determination of alleged 
concealment. Any investigation on the part of Ms. Mezenen's 
counsel regarding alleged concealment, which was based on Ms. 
Chatwin's trial testimony, could not have included the deposition 
of Mr. Mezenen, which took place months before the trial. 
In sum, the trial court's award to Ms. Mezenen of $10,000.00 
in attorney fees and $513.00 in costs is completely insupportable. 
The trial court utterly failed to employ any consideration 
whatsoever of the factors mandated by Utah law. This failure is 
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grounds for reversal in itself. Furthermore, the court entered its 
award because of Mr. Mezenen's alleged concealment, based on Ms. 
Chatwin's testimony, which was not even presented until the 
"investigation" by Ms. Mezenen's attorney had already taken place. 
Consequently, the trial court's attorney's fee award should be 
reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's decision is blatantly erroneous and 
insupportable in three respects. First, the court found that 
cohabitation during the period of temporary support had not 
occurred, despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary, including 
Ms. Mezenen's own testimony. A clearer showing of cohabitation, 
under Utah law, is difficult to imagine. Mr. Mezenen is entitled 
to a refund of alimony paid under the temporary orders. 
Second, the trial court improperly allowed Ms. Mezenen to 
amend her Complaint mid-trial, to Mr. Mezenen's significant 
prejudice. By allowing Ms. Mezenen to add a claim for attorney's 
fees at that late date, the trial court deprived Mr. Mezenen of any 
opportunity for reasonable investigation and examination regarding 
the work done, reasonableness, and necessity of the fees incurred. 
This is exactly the result that Rule 15(a) seeks to avoid. 
Finally, the fee award contains absolutely no consideration of 
the factors required by Utah law. These factors are not advisory, 
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they are mandatory upon trial courts. By failing to consider these 
factors, the trial court entered an insupportable award. The trial 
court's Findings regarding cohabitation, amendment, attorney's fees 
and costs should be reversed, and Mr. Mezenen awarded his fees and 
costs. 
DATED: July 17, 1997, 
CAMPBELL 18?ACK & SESSIONS 
/ / .A 
CLARK W. SESSIONS 
DEAN C. ANDREASEN 
KRISTINE EDDE 
Attorneys for 
Defendant/Appellant/Cross-Appellee 
Kelly Mezenen 
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The above-entitled action came on regularly for trial pursuant 
to notice before the undersigned, one of the Judges of the above-
entitled Court commencing on January 30, 1996 and continuing 
thereafter on January 31, 1996, May 20, 1996 and May 21, 1996. The 
Plaintiff Linda Mezenen appeared in person and by and through her 
jiattorney Randall Gaither. The Defendant Kelly Mezenen appeared in 
i! 
hperson and by and through h i s a t torney Clark W. Sessions. The 
I ! 
II Court heard and considered the testimony of the parties, various 
i I 
!jwitnesses, including expert witnesses, received and considered 
i [ 
'documentary evidence and heard the arguments and statements of 
i j 
! 
[1counsel. The Court having fully considered the matter and having 
[ issued its Memorandum Decision on May 29, 1996 now makes the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. ' The Court finds that the Plaintiff and Defendant were 
residents of Salt Lake County, State of Utah for a period in excess 
11 of three (3) months prior to the commencement of the above-entitled 
action. 
2. The Court finds that no children were born as the issue 
I of the marriage of the parties nor are any expected and that the 
parties have children from prior marriages. 
j 3. The Court finds that the parties became acquainted with 
jjeach other and moved into the same residence and used one checking 
| jaccount for their mutual benefit in approximately the summer of 
i l 
I j 1986 and that during that time the Plaintiff was unemployed, on 
| public assistance and housing, and had children from a previous 
! i 
;;marriage and relationship. The Court further finds that the 
i I 
: :Defendant was employed as a mechanic and heavy equipment operator 
Hand had previous experience in the operation, maintenance and 
jirepair of automobiles and construction equipment from his early 
j j years as a teenager growing up in a farming environment in eastern 
i! 
;!Utah. Defendant had a child from a previous marriage which the 
!;plaintiff cared for during the day. At that time the Defendant 
i moved into a residence which the Plaintiff was renting while on 
;!public housing he started to make payments out of his checking 
,»account for the rental payments which were subsidized by public 
'housing assistance. The parties were able to save money on housing 
i 
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because of the low housing payment that the Plaintiff had at that 
time until they purchased the Bagpiper residence. 
4. The Court finds that the parties dated each other and 
!spent time with each other both in the Roosevelt/Duchesne area and 
in Salt Lake County culminating in the parties7 moving in together 
in 1989. The Court further finds that during that period, the 
Plaintiff was still on welfare and unemployed whereas the Defendant 
was employed as a heavy equipment operator on the Jordanelle Dam 
i 
I project in Wasatch County, State of Utah. 
I 5. The Court finds that the parties were thereafter married 
i 
'on November 4, 1989 in Salt Lake County, State of Utah and resided 
I 
I together as husband and wife until their separation in September 
I 
1.1994. 
i 
J' 6. The Court finds that the Plaintiff brought into the 
', parties' relationship and marriage an automobile, pots, pans, 
] cooking utensils, a couch and her personal effects and wearing 
i 
< japparel. 
j 7. The Court finds that the Defendant brought into the 
t parties' relationship a Certificate of Deposit in both parties 
i names which he received as the result of an inheritance which 
i 
appreciated to the approximate sum of $13,000 and which is being 
! held at First Security Bank as collateral for the purchase of 
i certain equipment in Kelly's Excavating, LLC. The Court finds in 
addition that the Defendant had a house trailer which was sold, a 
lot in Duchesne, cash, various tools and equipment including 
3 
mechanics tools and other equipment and implements used in the 
construction business generally. 
I 8. The Court finds that the parties acquired a residence and 
real property on Bagpiper Circle in Salt Lake County, State of Utah 
I and that the Defendant paid from his pre-marital funds the sum of 
$5,800.00 as part of the down payment for the marital residence 
which the Court finds should be returned to the Defendant. 
! 9. The Court finds that during the course of the parties' 
•marriage, the Plaintiff worked at various part-time jobs including 
iSports Trax, the manufacture and sale of various handicraft works 
i 
!and Kelly's Excavating, LLC a few hours per week doing principally 
'clerical and accounting work. The Court further finds that since 
I 
| the parties' separation in the fall of 1994, Plaintiff has had 
'.'virtually no contact with Kelly's Excavating, LLC and that her 
11 . . . . . 
| J duties and responsibilities were assumed and discharged during that 
I jperiod by the Defendant based upon Court order that stated "The 
[I Defendant is permitted to operate the business jointly owned by the 
! i 
I parties as he has done historically. The Defendant shall not 
i 
; dispose of any asset of the business other than in the ordinary 
j!course of business without court order or the consent of the 
! .Plaintiff." 
| ; 
!! 10. The Court finds that during 1992, the Defendant and 
i i 
! ; 
;iPlaintiff, jointly determined to form an excavation business which 
i ' 
I;they started as a sole proprietorship but which was later converted 
i ' 
i to a Utah limited liability company and further that each of the 
i i 
II 4 
! i 
parties owned a fifty percent (50%) interest in that business. 
Additionally, the Court finds that the business of Kelly's 
Excavating, LLC since its inception has grown significantly and in 
particular that the business has acquired various vehicles, 
construction equipment, inventory, tools and equipment, all as 
detailed on Defendant's exhibits offered through Defendant's expert 
Merrill Norman, principally Exhibit D-18. 
11. The Court finds that the Defendant was and is responsible 
for securing customers for Kelly's Excavating, LLC, negotiating 
i 
!construction contracts, negotiating financing arrangements with 
i 
11various lenders, that no advertising of the business has been 
I; 
jI undertaken and specifically that there is no telephone listing, |j 
jl telephone book or similar advertising and that the business is 
j;dependent upon the Defendant and his construction skills and 
11 expertise for its successful operations. The Court finds in 
! iaddition that the Defendant works 12 to 14 hours per day, most 
j j 
;i often for a period of seven days each week and that when weather 
i i 
!
 impacts excavation, the Defendant works m maintaining and 
'.•repairing business equipment and vehicles which the Court finds are 
i adequately maintained. 
12. The Court finds that Kelly's Excavating, LLC conducts its 
i 
libusiness principally from the residence of the Defendant and an 
^adjacent shop as well as a vacant lot known as the Bagley property 
•'on which is located a storage trailer, inventory, parts and 
;
 equipment that belong to the business. Further, the Court finds 
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I that no charges were made by the Defendant to the business for the 
use of heat, electricity and other utilities of the Defendant which 
were used.by the business. 
13. The Court finds that in the forepart of 1994, the 
business paid the Defendant $2,000.00 per month as and for wages 
and salary and that in order for the Plaintiff to have sufficient 
I earnings to enable her to claim her children as exemptions and 
[deductions for income tax purposes, there was a shift of the 
I$2,000.00 per month salary to the Plaintiff and the Defendant 
;1received no direct salary from the business thereafter based upon II 
jI the temporary order of the court which permitted the Defendant a 
j i 
idraw and the Plaintiff $1,200.00 in alimony in lieu of the draw 
jiwhich she requested. 
I i 
II 14. The Court finds that during the latter part of 1995, the 
i!Defendant made the decision to close the business of Kelly's 
i ; 
!'Excavating, LLC and to become employed in the construction industry 
i ' 
j' for others and further that he could earn from such employment 
|| |! $18.00 to $24.00 per hour plus benefits, including life and health 
I! 
;! insurance, which benefits Defendant did not receive through Kelly's 
j;Excavating, LLC. The Court finds in addition that given the duties 
j and responsibilities of the Defendant in the operation of the 
1
 business, and his experience, a reasonable salary for the Defendant 
:;would approximate $72,000 per year. 
j •' 
r 15. The Court finds that the Plaintiff is currently engaged 
; in a training program with Ames Construction that she is able to 
i 
! 
provide for her own support and maintenance without contribution 
from the Defendant and that she seeks no alimony or other marital 
support from him. The Court finds in addition, that the 
expectation of the Plaintiff upon completion of her training 
program is that she will receive a fairly significant pay increase 
at her new job and position. In addition, the Court finds that 
each of the parties are in good health and suffer from no physical 
or mental impairment that would prevent them from earning a living. 
16. The Court finds that the Defendant was ordered to pay to 
the Plaintiff as 'and for alimony on a temporary basis the sum of 
if$1,200.00 per month and that certain of the alimony payments were 
j 
| made directly by Kelly's Excavating, LLC which the parties' 
! 
1 
I accounting experts adjusted. The Court further finds that the 
h 
MDefendant is current in his alimony payments through the date of 
i; 
11 trial and that the parties agreed in the Fall of 1995 that the 
!;Defendant could increase his salary from the business to $4,000.00 
jjper month in consideration of which the business would continue at 
least through trial. 
17. The Court finds that in approximately December of 1994, 
the Plaintiff became acquainted with one Robert Grumwald and that 
during the period January 1995 through the commencement of trial, 
!!the Plaintiff traveled to the midwest with Mr. Grumwald on at least 
I • 
jitwo occasions, once together and once with the Plaintiff and her 
family for the purpose of meeting Mr. Grumwald's family; that Mr. 
: Grumwald paid for the transportation costs of the Plaintiff and her 
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I!family as well as lodging and meals during those trips and further 
that those parties engaged in sexual intercourse while on those 
I trips. The Plaintiff, Linda Mezenen, prior to meeting Mr. Grumwald 
had purchased in her own name a separate residence where she has 
jbeen living with her daughter from a previous marriage and which is 
i 
I located within one block of the Defendant's residence. Tiffany 
II Anderson has been renting the spare bedroom from time to time in 
!|the residence. Mr. Grumwald at no time moved any of his personal 
I jeffects, clothing or possessions into any of the bedrooms located 
ij 
pin the residence and the only personal property that was stored at 
'the residence was some snowmobiles in the Plaintiff's garage for a 
i ; 
i i 
j;short period of time until Mr. Grumwald could find a location to 
!!store the snowmobiles. Mr. Grumwald was working most of the time 
i ! 
!:in 1994 and 1995 out of the State of Utah and during the periods of 
''time he was staying in the state of Utah, he rented motel rooms and 
-used the motel as his residence during the times he was in the 
j:State of Utah. Mr. Grumwald had a permanent residence in another 
iiState for which all of his mail and other correspondence was mailed 
h 
.and at not time did he ever use the Plaintiff's residence as his 
!
 legal mailing address. 
18. The Court finds that the Defendant and Mr. Grumwald 
! traveled on vacations during 1995, principally for fishing and 
camping activities which were funded by Mr. Grumwald and during 
which vacation periods those parties had sexual intercourse. The 
Plaintiff testified that during 1995 she had gone on vacations with 
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other male friends and had dated other persons other than Mr. 
Grumwald. The Court finds that Mr. Grumwald did maintain a 
residence in the State of Utah outside of Plaintiff's residence, 
and according to the undisputed testimony only stayed at the 
Plaintiff's residence for possibly one evening over one night on 
sporadic occasions. During periods of time when Mr. Grumwald was 
out-of-state and residing out-of-state, the Plaintiff had allowed 
Mr. Grumwald to park and store his vehicle at her residence and 
observations of the vehicle by neighbors or employees of the 
Defendant do not mean that Mr. Grumwald was staying as a guest with 
Ithe Plaintiff. 
j 19. The Court finds that Mr. Grumwald did not maintain a 
Ijpermanent residence in the State of Utah, but that while he was 
i ' 
j!here working for Ames Construction Company, on occasion while there 
lias a guest, he used the telephone and utilities without paying any 
ij 
I!of the expenses for occasional use, assisted the Plaintiff's 
'! 
j; children with their homework, parked his vehicles there on 
II 
iSovernight occasions, engaged in sexual intercourse with the 
i! 
jJPlaintiff on numerous occasions throughout the calendar year 1995 
land to the date of trial and was observed both inside the 
! iPlaintiff's residence and outside working in the yard and in the 
! iPlaintiff's garage on numerous occasions by the Defendant, his 
employees and others who resided in and around the neighborhood 
;
 where Plaintiff's residence was located and that in his job he 
traveled out of state extensively, principally in Idaho and Nevada. 
20. The Court finds that the claim of the Defendant for 
termination of and reimbursement to him of alimony for that period 
on grounds of cohabitation should be denied, the Court specifically 
finding that the Defendant has failed to prove by a preponderance 
of the evidence that Plaintiff has resided with a person of the 
opposite sex since the date of the parties' separation and that the 
Plaintiff was paid directly out of the profits of the business and 
not by the Defendant. Further this was the only benefit received 
by the Plaintiff from the business during separation from her 50% 
ownership interest in the business. 
21. The Court finds and the record will reflect that the 
Plaintiff filed during the course of the trial a motion to amend 
Plaintiff's Complaint to include a claim for attorney's fees on the 
various grounds including concealment of assets from the Court 
supported by a detailed breakdown of legal fees in Exhibit 38, the 
Court finds that the amendment is proper and should be granted. 
The Defendant has- withheld assets from consideration of the Court 
by not cashing certain checks, but by placing them in a file or 
drawer to be cashed after the divorce became final, the Court 
noting however, that it is difficult due to the nature of the 
conduct to determine the amount involved; the Court finds that the 
rates and fees charged by Plaintiff's counsel in connection with 
his effort to determine all of the assets of the business and the 
difficulty in doing so by reason of Defendant's conduct, it is fair 
and reasonable and that the Court should order Defendant to pay to 
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the Plaintiff as and for attorney's fees the sum of $10,000.00 and 
costs of $90.00 for the transcript; $398.00 for the deposition of 
the Defendant and the filing fee. Evidence was introduced from 
several witnesses discovered and called by the Plaintiff that the 
Defendant was hiding or concealing assets. Donna Chatwin testified 
that she operated heavy equipment for Kelly's Excavating, LLC for 
periods of time in May through August 1995 and November 1995 
through January 1996 without pay. During this period of time she 
was never listed as an employee although she identified projects 
she would be working without Mr. Mezenen ever being present. She 
testified that Mr. Mezenen ordered an employee to move property to 
the garage at her residence from Kelly's Excavating, LLC on the 
night before the appraisal was to take place for the purpose of the 
Court hearing. She indicated that Mr. Mezenen told her that he hid 
the property in her garage because he did not want the appraiser to 
see the property. She testified that there was a substantial 
amount of property which filled her 3-car garage. She also 
testified that there were uncashed checks which she saw in the file 
drawer of Kelly's Excavating, LLC and that Mr. Mezenen said that he 
was going to use in the future to pay off any divorce settlement 
with Linda Mezenen. Donna Chatwin testified that she worked on a 
project and that when a check was made out to Kelly's Excavating, 
LLC, Mr. Mezenen told her to tear up the check and to obtain 
another check which evidence was supported by the person that wrote 
the check. Mr. Mezenen admitted that he did receive a check for a 
11 
specific project and that the check was turned over to Gary 
Fielding without being accounted for in the books and records of 
the business- Donna Chatwin testified that there were invoices for 
projects upon which she worked that did not coincide with the date 
on which she recalled working the projects- Donna Chatwin 
identified a job for Mary Williams for which heavy equipment had to 
be moved from Provo, Utah at company expense for digging footings 
and other work which the Defendant failed to report on the 
accounting information required by Court Order. The Defendant, 
Kelly Mezenen, admitted that the amount of the project of 
approximately $1,000.00 was converted to an alleged verbal trade 
which was never disclosed to any of the accountants preparing the 
books and records for Court and only revealed upon cross-
examination during the trial. The Defendant wrote off an account 
receivable from Tom Biesinger as a bad debt without reporting to 
any person until discovered during trial that he had taken a camp 
trailer in trade for the account receivable which he falsely 
reported during trial as an uncollectible. 
22. The Court finds after extensive consideration of the 
testimony offered by Plaintiff's expert Robin Baster and 
Defendant's expert Merrill Norman with respect to the valuation of 
the business of Kelly's Excavating, LLC that while Mr. Baster 
indicated the outside limit of the value of the business to be in 
the neighborhood of $440,000, he offered no opinion as to its 
actual fair market value at the time of trial. The Court finds on 
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the other hand, that Mr. Norman determined the value of the 
business to be approximately $112,000, which testimony the Court 
finds is more credible and has a more sound basis in the facts of 
this case and as such the Court finds the business of Kelly's 
Excavating, LLC has a value of $112,000, and further that all of 
the assets of the business as found by Mr. Norman to be a part of 
the business and should be awarded to the Defendant as his sole and 
separate property without claim from the Plaintiff. 
23. The Court finds and the files and records herein will 
reflect that the plaintiff seeks reimbursement for one-half of all 
net income shown on the books and records of the business since the 
parties' separation in September of 1994, less the amount that she 
has received in temporary alimony. With respect to Plaintiff's 
claim, the Court finds there is no cash fund from which the 
calculated undistributed profits could be paid to the Plaintiff and 
that if any cash exists in the company or accounts receivable, such 
was included as a basis for Mr. Norman's calculation of the worth 
of the business. The Court further finds that the evidence is 
established that all monies that have been withdrawn from the 
company since the date of separation of the parties is accounted 
for either in draws which the Defendant has received and which 
represent a reasonable salary or in amounts paid to the Plaintiff 
as alimony. As such, the Court finds that there are no 
undistributed net profits to which the Plaintiff would be entitled 
and her claim therefore should be denied. 
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24. The Court finds that prior to the marriage of the 
parties, and by their stipulation, a lot in Duchesne, Utah claimed 
by the Defendant is his pre-marital property and should be awarded 
to him as his sole and separate property without claim from the 
Plaintiff. 
25. The Court finds that since the parties' marriage, they 
acquired a lot known as the New Haven Lot with a fair market value 
of $19,000 which should be awarded to the Plaintiff as her sole and 
separate property without claim from the Defendant and the 
Defendant be required to pay any obligation to his parents. 
26. The Court finds that the parties acquired a lot known as 
the Bagley lot which is included in the assets of Kelly's 
Excavating, LLC to be awarded to the Defendant as his sole and 
separate property and as such the Plaintiff's claim thereto should 
be denied. 
27. The Court finds that the parties maintained a safe in 
their marital residence and that during the course of their 
marriage, various amounts of cash were placed into and withdrawn 
from the safe. While the evidence on the amount in the safe at 
various times was in dispute, the Court finds that at the time of 
the separation of the parties, there was approximately $19,000 in 
the parties safe which was accumulated during the marriage by 
buying and selling property and savings. The Court finds in 
addition, that said amount has been substantially used by the 
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Defendant and therefore awards that sum and amount to him as his 
sole and separate property without claim from the Plaintiff. 
28. The Court finds that during the parties' association and 
subsequent marriage, they acquired a residence and real property on 
Bagpiper Circle in Salt Lake County and completed remodeling and 
repairs to that property including the construction of a shop 
adjacent thereto from which the business of Kelly's Excavating, LLC 
is conducted. The Court further finds that the parties stipulated 
as to the equity in that property and the payment to the Plaintiff 
of her portion thereof. Specifically, the Court finds that the 
Defendant paid $5,800 of pre-marital funds as a down payment on the 
Bagpiper residence which should be returned to him and that the 
Defendant should pay to the Plaintiff $12,700 as her share of the 
balance of the equity in the Bagpiper residence. As per the 
parties' stipulation, her equity calculated at $12,700, less $5,800 
or a net equity of $6,900 should be paid by the Defendant to the 
Plaintiff within ninety (90) days following the entry of the Decree 
of Divorce herein. 
29. The Court finds that the parties had pre-marital property 
or property acquired by them since their separation with their 
separate funds and awards such property as follows: 
a. To the Plaintiff: The vehicle she is currently 
driving and a couch which she brought into the marriage. 
b. To the Defendant: A Certificate of Deposit at First 
Security Bank in the approximate sum of $13,000, a Kenwood 
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stereo and speakers, a quilt from Defendant's son Derek's 
great-grandmother, tackle boxes, canner, 1972 Chevrolet truck 
and a 1987 Corvette automobile. 
30. The Court finds after reviewing the parties' claims as to 
personal property as specifically set forth in Exhibits D-15, D-16, 
D-17 and P-3 6, that the Plaintiff has personal property with a 
value of approximately $6,000 and the Defendant has personal 
property with a value of approximately $10,000. The Court that it 
is fair, just and equitable that each of the parties be awarded 
that property currently in their possession free and clear of any 
claim from the other. 
31. The Court finds that the parties have made personal loans 
to two acquaintenances and that there is an amount due the parties 
from a Mr. Steele the sum of $2,600 and from a Mr. Fielding, the 
sum of $1,296.00 which the Court finds should be divided equally 
between the parties at such time as they are collected and paid. 
32. The Court finds that there are various debts and 
obligations associated with Kelly's Excavating, LLC which should be 
assumed and paid by the Defendant as well as obligations from the 
Defendant to his parents which he should assume, pay, discharge and 
hold the Plaintiff harmless from. The Court finds in addition that 
each of the parties should be ordered to pay those obligations and 
debts incurred by that party since their separation in the summer 
of 1994. 
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33. The Court finds that while there is a significant dispute 
between the parties as to their rights, duties and obligations in 
connection with federal and state individual income tax returns, 
that it is fair, just and equitable that the parties should file 
individual state and federal income tax returns for 1994 and 1995 
each having the benefit of pre-paid taxes as would be permitted 
under applicable law for equal owners of the business of Kelly's 
Excavating, LLC. Further, the Court finds that if the parties so 
agree, they may file such returns on a married, filing jointly 
basis. 
34. The Court finds that the award of property to the 
Plaintiff herein totals $2 5,000 and to the Defendant herein, the 
sum of $141,000. It is therefore fair, just and equitable that the 
Defendant be required to pay to the Plaintiff $58,000 to equalize 
the property distribution. 
Based upon the foregoing findings of fact, the Court now 
concludes as follows: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now 
concludes as follows: 
1. That the Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter 
hereof and the parties hereto. 
2. That Plaintiff is entitled to be awarded a Decree of 
Divorce from Defendant on the grounds of irreconcilable differences 
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and that such should become final upon its entry as provided by 
law. 
3. That each of the parties should be ordered to execute 
such deeds, conveyances, bills of sale and other documents as may 
be necessary to transfer the property awarded by the Court to the 
party entitled thereto and to implement the terms hereof. 
4. That the Court should make and enter its Decree of 
Divorce accordingly. 
DATED this <$ day of-X^^^rfSHL'^fiSe. 
FRANK G^ NOEL^ 
District^ £6iiix Judge" 
7 APPROVED THIS *> / DAY OF AUGUST 1996. 
RANDALI1 GAIT! 
Attorney fo ntiff 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
LINDA MEZENEN, 
v. 
KELLY MEZENEN, 
Plaintiff, : 
Defendant. 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
: Civil No. 944903679 DA 
: Judge Frank G. Noel 
The above-entitled action came on regularly for trial pursuant 
to notice before the undersigned, one of the Judges of the above-
entitled Court .commencing on January 30, 1996 and continuing 
thereafter on January 31, 1996, May 20, 1996 and May 21, 1996. The 
Plaintiff Linda Mezenen appeared in person and by and through her 
attorney Randall Gaither. The Defendant Kelly Mezenen appeared in 
person and by and through his attorney Clark W. Sessions. The 
Court heard and considered the testimony of the parties, various 
witnesses, including expert witnesses, received and considered 
documentary evidence and heard the arguments and statements of 
counsel. The Court having fully considered the matter and having 
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heretofore entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law now 
ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES as follows: 
1. That the Plaintiff be and she is hereby awarded a Decree 
of Divorce from the Defendant on the grounds of irreconcilable 
differences, said Decree to become final upon its entry herein as 
by law provided. 
2. That no alimony or other marital support or maintenance 
is awarded to the Plaintiff herein. 
3. That the Defendant is not entitled to a refund of any 
alimony paid under the temporary orders existing and in force 
herein. 
4. That the claim of the Defendant therefore being based 
upon the alleged cohabitation of the Plaintiff with a person of the 
opposite sex be and the same is hereby denied. 
5. That prior to the marriage of the parties, the Defendant 
acquired a lot in Duchesne, Utah which is hereby awarded to the 
Defendant as his sole and separate property without claim from the 
Plaintiff. 
6. That the Plaintiff be and she is hereby awarded as her 
sole and separate property the vehicle she is currently driving and 
a couch she brought into the marriage. The Defendant be and he is 
hereby awarded as his sole and separate property without claim from 
the Plaintiff a certificate of deposit at First Security Bank in 
the approximate amount of $13,000, Kenwood stereo and speakers, a 
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quilt from Defendant's son Derek's great-grandmother, tackle boxes, 
canner, a 1972 Chevrolet truck and a 1987 Corvette. The parties be 
and they are hereby awarded those items of personal property 
currently in their possession other than as hereinabove 
specifically set forth. 
7. That the Defendant be and he is hereby awarded as his 
sole and separate property all of the parties' right, title and 
interest in and to Kelly's Excavating, LLC, including the business 
and all assets of the business as found and determined by 
Defendant's expert Merrill Norman and that the claim of the 
Plaintiff for undistributed net profits from Kelly's Excavating, 
LLC be and the same is hereby denied. 
8. That the Defendant be and he is hereby awarded as his 
sole and separate property all funds in the parties' safe in an 
original amount of approximately $19,000 which amount has been 
substantially used by the Defendant prior to the date hereof. 
9. That the New Haven building lot acquired by the parties 
be and the same is hereby awarded to the Plaintiff as her sole and 
separate property without claim from the Defendant and the 
Defendant be and he is hereby ordered to pay any obligation 
connected therewith to his parents. 
10. That the Bagpiper Circle marital residence acquired by 
the parties during the course of their marriage be and the same is 
Ihereby awarded to the Defendant as his sole and separate property 
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parties less a deduction of $5,800 representing the Defendant's 
pre-marital property, the Defendant be and he is hereby ordered to 
pay to the Plaintiff the balance in the amount of $64,900. 
15. That the parties be and they are hereby ordered to file 
individual federal and state income tax returns for the calendar 
year 1994 and 1995 and that each should have the benefit of pre-
paid taxes such as would be permitted under law for equal owners of 
the business of Kelly's Excavating, LLC. If both parties can 
agree, they are instructed to file such returns on a married, 
filing jointly basis. 
16. That each of the parties shall assume, pay and discharge 
their own costs and attorneys fees incurred herein, provided 
however, the Plaintiff be and she is hereby awarded as and for 
attorney's fees from the Defendant the sum of $10,000.00 together 
with costs of $513.00. 
17. That each of the parties be and they are hereby ordered 
to execute such deeds, conveyances, bills of sale and other 
documents as are necessary to transfer the property awarded by the 
Court to the party entitled thereto and to cooperate each with the 
other in implementing the terms hereof. , 
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DATED this $~~ day ofj^g^£^L» 1996. 
APPROVED THIS ^ /DAY OF AUGUST 1996. 
RANDALL GAITHER 
Attorney /for Pla^ Tntif] 
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30-3-3. Award of costs, attorney and witness fees — Tem-
porary alimony. 
(1) In any action filed under Title 30, Chapter 3, 4, or 6, and in any action 
to establish an order of custody, visitation, child support, alimony, or division 
of property in a domestic case, the court may order a party to pay the costs, 
attorney fees, and witness fees, including expert witness fees, of the other 
party to enable the other party to prosecute or defend the action. The order 
may include provision for costs of the action. 
(2) In any action to enforce an order of custody, visitation, child support, 
alimony, or division of property in a domestic case, the court may award costs 
and attorney fees upon determining that the party substantially prevailed 
upon the claim or defense. The court, in its discretion, may award no fees or 
limited fees against a party if the court finds the party is impecunious or enters 
in the record the reason for not awarding fees. 
(3) In any action listed in Subsection (1), the court may order a party to 
provide money, during the pendency of the action, for the separate support and 
maintenance of the other party and of any children in the custody of the other 
party. 
(4) Orders entered under this section prior to entry of the final order or 
judgment may be amended during the course of the action or in the final order 
or judgment. 
30-3-5. Disposition of property — Maintenance and 
health care of parties and children — Division of 
debts — Court to have continuing jurisdiction — 
Custody and visitation — Determination of ali-
mony — Nonmeritorious petition for modifica-
tion. 
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it 
equitable orders relating to the children, property, debts or obhgations, and 
parties. The court shall include the following in every decree of divorce: 
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of reasonable and 
necessary medical and dental expenses of the dependent children; 
(b) if coverage is or becomes available at a reasonable cost, an order 
requiring the purchase and maintenance of appropriate health, hospital, 
and dental care insurance for the dependent children; 
(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5: 
(i) an order specifying which party is responsible for the payment of 
joint debts, obhgations, or liabilities of the parties contracted or 
incurred during marriage; 
(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify respective creditors or 
obligees, regarding the court's division of debts, obligations, or liabili-
ties and regarding the parties' separate, current addresses; and 
(iii) provisions for the enforcement of these orders; 
(d) provisions for income withholding in accordance with Title 62A, 
Chapter 11, Parts 4 and 5; and 
(e) with regard to child support orders issued or modified on or after 
January 1, 1994, that are subject to income withholding, an order 
assessing against the obligor an additional $7 per month check processing 
fee to be included in the amount withheld and paid to the Office of 
Recovery Services within the Department of Human Services for the 
purposes of income withholding in accordance with Title 62A, Chapter 11, 
Parts 4 and 5. 
(2) The court may include, in an order determining child support, an order 
assigning financial responsibility for all or a portion of child care expenses 
incurred on behalf of the dependent children, necessitated by the employment 
or training of the custodial parent. If the court determines that the circum-
stances are appropriate and that the dependent children would be adequately 
cared for, it may include an order allowing the noncustodial parent to provide 
child care for the dependent children, necessitated by the employment or 
training of the custodial parent. 
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or 
new orders for the custody of the children and their support, maintenance, 
health, and dental care, and for distribution of the property and obligations for 
debts as is reasonable and necessary. 
(4) (a) In determining visitation rights of parents, grandparents, and other 
members of the immediate family, the court shall consider the best 
interest of the child. 
(b) Upon a specific finding by the court of the need for peace officer 
enforcement, the court may include in an order establishing a visitation 
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schedule a provision, among other things, authorizing any peace officer to 
enforce a court ordered visitation schedule entered under this chapter. 
(5) If a petition for modification of child custody or visitation provisions of a 
court order is made and denied, the court shall order the petitioner to pay the 
reasonable attorneys' fees expended by the prevailing party in that action, if 
the court determines that the petition was without merit and not asserted or 
defended against in good faith. 
(6) If a petition alleges substantial noncompliance with a visitation order by 
a parent, a grandparent, or other member of the immediate family pursuant to 
Section 78-32-12.2 where a visitation right has been previously granted by the 
court, the court may award to the prevailing party costs, including actual 
attorney fees and court costs incurred by the prevailing party because of the 
other party's failure to provide or exercise court-ordered visitation. 
(7) (a) The court shall consider at least the following factors in determining 
alimony: 
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse; 
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income; 
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support; and 
(iv) the length of the marriage. 
(b) The court may consider the fault of the parties in determining 
alimony 
(c) As a general rule, the court should look to the standard of living, 
existing at the time of separation, in determining alimony in accordance 
with Subsection (a). However, the court shall consider all relevant facts 
and equitable principles and may, in its discretion, base alimony on the 
standard of living that existed at the time of trial. In marriages of short 
duration, when no children have been conceived or born during the 
marriage, the court may consider the standard of living that existed at the 
time of the marriage. 
(d) The court may, under appropriate circumstances, attempt to equal-
ize the parties' respective standards of living. 
(e) When a marriage of long duration dissolves on the threshold of a 
major change in the income of one of the spouses due to the collective 
efforts of both, that change shall be considered in dividing the marital 
property and in determining the amount of alimony. If one spouse's 
earning capacity has been greatly enhanced through the efforts of both 
spouses during the marriage, the court may make a compensating 
adjustment in dividing the marital property and awarding alimony. 
(f) In determining alimony when a marriage of short duration dissolves, 
and no children have been conceived or born during the marriage, the 
court may consider restoring each party to the condition which existed at 
the time of the marriage. 
(g) (i) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make substantive 
changes and new orders regarding alimony based on a substantial 
material change in circumstances not forseeable at the time of the 
divorce. 
(ii) The court may not modify alimony or issue a new order for 
alimony to address needs of the recipient that did not exist at the time 
the decree was entered, unless the court finds extenuating circum-
stances that justify that action. 
(iii) In determining alimony, the income of any subsequent spouse 
of the payor may not be considered, except as provided in this 
subsection. 
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(A) The court may consider the subsequent spouse's financial 
ability to share living expenses. 
(B) The court may consider the income of a subsequent spouse 
if the court finds that the payor's improper conduct justifies that 
consideration. 
(h) Alimony may not be ordered for a duration longer than the number 
of years that the marriage existed unless, at any time prior to termination 
of alimony, the court finds extenuating circumstances that justify the 
payment of alimony for a longer period of time. 
(8) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, any order of 
the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse automatically terminates 
upon the remarriage of that former spouse. However, if the remarriage is 
annulled and found to be void ab initio, payment of alimony shall resume if the 
party paying alimony is made a party to the action of annulment and his rights 
are determined. 
(9) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse 
terminates upon establishment by the party paying alimony that the former 
spouse is cohabitating with another person. 
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Linda Mezenen, 
Plaintiff, Appellee and Cross-Appellant, 
v. Case No. 960652-CA 
Kelly Mezenen, 
Defendant, Appellant and Cross-Appellee. 
Dear Counsel: 
The record index on this appeal was filed in this court. The record 
remains on file with the trial court for your use in preparing your brief. 
The purpose of this letter, therefore, is to set the briefing schedule. 
Pursuant to Rules 13 and 26, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the 
appellant's brief must be served and filed on or before July 17, 1997. This 
due date takes into consideration the three days mailing provision of Rule 
22(d) . 
Parties are advised to refer to Rules 24, 26, and 27, Utah R. App. P., 
for content and format requirements. These requirements are strictly 
enforced, and the brief may be returned pursuant to Rule 2 7(d) if not properly 
prepared. 
Please be reminded that in civil cases where the record, excluding any 
transcripts, totals 3 00 pages or more, all parties must file with the clerk of 
the trial court, within 10 days after briefing is completed, a joint or 
separate designation of those papers referred to in their respective briefs. 
Only those designated papers, and those papers identified in Rule 11(d)(2)(B) 
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, will be transmitted to this court by 
the clerk of the trial court. 
Failure to perfect an appeal at any time during the appeal process may 
result in dismissal of the appeal. 
Sincerely, , 
/
 / ii 
Susan Willis 
Deputy Court Clerk 
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